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ORIGINALISM:
A THING WORTH DOING . . .
D. A. Jeremy Telman*
Originalism in constitutional interpretation continues to
grow in its reach, its sophistication, its practical applicability and
its popular support. Originally conceived as a doctrine of judicial
modesty, originalist judges are now far more confident in their
ability to discern the Constitution’s original meaning and to strike
down legislative enactments inconsistent with that meaning. Two
aphorisms by the leading practitioners of originalism sum up
originalism’s journey. Justice Scalia, writing in the 1980s,
conceded that originalism was merely “the lesser evil” and
consoled himself with the Chestertonian dictum that “a thing
worth doing is worth doing badly.” Justice Thomas places fewer
limitations on his own belief in originalist method and adopts as
his motto “anything worth doing is worth doing right.” The
challenge for contemporary originalism is that it is not the sort of
thing that G.K. Chesterton thought was worth doing badly, but it
also may be the sort of thing that is very difficult to do right.
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I.

Introduction:
Discontents

Originalism

and

Its

This Article presents a slice of a larger project with the
working title “Originalism and Its Discontents.” The title alludes
to Freud’s classic sociological work, Civilization and Its
Discontents.1 Freud there contended that there is an inescapable
malaise associated with human psychology2 – although we strive
for happiness,3 we suffer continuously from feelings of frustration
and incompletion, even as our cultural and technological
accomplishments mount.4 We mistake absences for losses and thus
feel perpetually cheated out of what we never had.5
I contend that a similar sociological phenomenon underlies the
movement that favors originalism in constitutional interpretation.
We see the familiar confusion between absences and losses in the
titles of some classics of originalist scholarship, such as Robert

1

SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (James Strachey,
transl., 1961). Freud insists that Civilization and Its Discontents is not a work of
psychoanalysis, and he claims not to shares with his readers any insights drawn
from psychoanalysis until Chapter 7. Id. at 90 (“And here at last an idea comes
in which belongs entirely to psycho-analyasis and which is foreign to people’s
ordinary way of thinking.”). See Leo Bersani, Speaking Psycholanalysis, in
WHOSE FREUD? THE PLACE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE
(Peter Brooks & Alex Woloch, eds., 2000) [hereinafter WHOSE FREUD?] 154,
154-55 (characterizing Freud as complaining that the argument of Civilization
and Its Discontents largely derives from information that is “universally known”
and does not rely on the insights of pyschoanalysis).
2
See, e.g., FREUD, CIVILIZATION, at 20 (arguing that people seek solace in
religion in order to escape the feelings of helplessness they experience as
infants); id. at 26, 37 (contending that humans’ ability to experience happiness
bumps up against three insuperable barriers: nature’s superior powers, our own
bodily feebleness, and other people).
3
See id. at 25 (contending that people strive for happiness and that “purpose of
life is simply the programme of the pleasure principle”).
4
Id. at 44-45 (observing that even as we attain an almost god-like character we
remain unhappy).
5
For an extended discussion of the complicated relationship between absence
and loss, see Dominick LaCapra, Reflections on Trauma, Absence, and Loss, in
WHOSE FREUD, at 178-204 (treating the relationship of absence and loss as akin
to that between structural and historical trauma).
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Bork’s A Country I Do Not Recognize 6 and Randy Barnett’s
Restoring the Lost Constitution.7 The question at the heart of the
project of which this Article is a part is why originalism arose
when it did in the 1960s and why it has had such appeal beyond the
legal profession and the legal academy and grown into a cultural
movement that is still going as strong as ever half a century later.
While this Article hopes to shed some light on the broader issue,
the focus here is on the practice of originalism in constitutional
interpretation in the early 21st century.
This Article will proceed as follows. In Part II, I briefly sketch
the history of originalism since the 1960s by highlighting what I
regard as the two most striking developments in originalist
methodology. Part III sketches what is in my view the unavoidable
tension between the compelling and perhaps even inescapable
logic of the originalist credo and its epistemological limits. In Part
IV, I highlight these epistemological limits in the work of two of
originalism’s greatest contemporary practitioners, Justices Scalia
and Thomas. Part V concludes with some thoughts about what lies
ahead for originalism.
What follows is neither a defense of nor an attack on
originalism. My purpose is not to dethrone originalism, which
some now consider the dominant mode of constitutional
interpretation, and propose an alternative. Rather, I am working as
an intellectual historian to understand the currents that underlie a
cultural moment and to highlight its accomplishments as well as
the challenges that it faces. Much of what follows is critical of
originalism, but pointing out the limitations of a theory is not the
same as suggesting that it is obsolete or that the alternatives are
preferable.

6

ROBERT H. BORK (ed.), A COUNTRY I DO NOT RECOGNIZE: THE LEGAL
ASSAULT ON AMERICAN VALUES (2005) [herinafter A COUNTRY]; see also
ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM
AND AMERICAN DECLINE (1996).
7
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PREUMPTION
OF LIBERTY (Rev’d ed. 2013).
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II.

Originalism’s Journey

This argument of this section is simple. First, the history of
originalism shows that this approach is a 20th-century innovation in
constitutional interpretation, and it has developed and changed
very rapidly in the half-century since it was first articulated as a
radical departure from the dominant approach to constitutional
adjudication of the 1960s and 70s. Second, as originalism has
grown in sophisticatation and persuasive power, it has also become
more self-confident. As a consequence of that confidence,
contemporary originalism no longer eschews judicial activism,
opposition to which inspired the early originalists. Rather,
contemporary originalists at times embrace activism and urge
judges to reject legislative enactments that they believe exceed
legislative power according to the Constitution’s original meaning.
Two important aphorisms by the two leading practitioners of
Originalism capture this second, less appreciated development in
Originalism. Justice Antonin Scalia’s defense of originalism relied
crucially on his argument that “a thing worth doing is worth doing
badly,” 8 a motto that captures early originalism’s selfconsciousness of its own limitations as a methodology of
constitutional interpretation. Justice Clarence Thomas counters in
his autobiography with his own motto: “Any job worth doing is
worth doing right.” 9 Justice Thomas’s motto articulates the selfconfidence with which originalist scholars and judges, including
Justice Scalia, currently proceed. However, while Justice
Thomas’s motto better captures the originalist movement in its
present form, this Article illustrates (in Part IV) through a close
reading of the two Justices’ originalist slogans that Justice Scalia’s
motto is more in keeping with the modest capabilities of originalist
jurisprudence.

A.

Originalism’s Precursors

8

Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U CIN. L. Rev. 849, 863
(1989).
9
CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR 38, 424 (2007).
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Originalism seems obvious and inescapable to us now, but it
was almost unheard of until the 1960s. Contemporary originalism
had its antecedents in the Four Horsemen of the judicial reaction
during the Lochner era.10 According to legal historian G. Edward
White, the jurisprudence of those who resisted the New Deal
entailed the view that:
[T]he Constitution was not designed to change with time. Its
principles were universal, and thus its “meaning” at a
generalized level was fixed. Its structure and language were not
altered by events but accommodated events. Events were seen
as precipitating restatements of fundamental constitutional
principles.11

But the jurisprudence of the Four Horsemen did not command a
stable majority even during the Lochner era. In holding that
federal authority pursuant to the Article II treaty power could
exceed that of Congress alone in Missouri v. Holland in 1920,
Justice Holmes composed on behalf of seven Justices the following
hymn to living constitutionalism:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act,
like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that
they have called into life a being the development of which
could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its
begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they
had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their
successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a
nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our
The “Four Horsemen” label did not become common until the 1950s. G.
EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000), 285. Barry
Cushman, a leading historian of the New Deal, sets out a caricatured narrative of
the “switch in time” in which he describes the Four Horsemen (Justices Van
Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland an Butler) as pursuing a jurisprudence
“driven by their devotion to the anachronistic tenets of laissez-faire economics
and their sympathetic subservience to the interests of rich and powerful people
and institutions.” BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE
STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 3 (1998). Cushman has
promoted a far more nuanced assessment of the “Four Horsemen,” noting that
they were by no means united on all issues, nor were their votes always best
understood as promoting political conservatism. See Barry Cushman, The
Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 VIRG. L. REV. 559 (1997).
11
WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 205.
10
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whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a
hundred years ago.12

Justice Holmes’s words, perhaps because they are Justice
Holmes’s words, exude self-confidence and serenity, as though he
were merely reminding his readers of truths as self evident as those
enumerated in the Declaration of Independence. Two dissenting
Justices filed no opinion.
The New Deal Supreme Court extended this outlook as early as
1934,13 when Chief Justice Hughes upheld a state law that enabled
courts to postpone mortgage deadlines in the face of a challenge
based on the Constitution’s Contracts Clause. 14 Chief Justice
Hughes was well aware that the Contracts Clause was enacted to
prevent states from passing legislation just like that being
challenged. 15 Invoking Chief Justice John Marshall’s famous
reminder that “we must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding,”16 Chief Justice Hughes rejected the notion that “the
great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the
interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook
of their time, would have placed upon them.”17 If the “meaning”
of the Contracts Clause entails “the social implications of its
application,” then the mortgage crisis of the 1930s was not the
same as the debt crisis that the Framers contemplated when they
ratified the Constitution. 18 Not surprisingly, Justice Sutherland
wrote a vigorous dissent, in which the other three Horsemen
joined.19
12

252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920)
Home Bulding & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
14
See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10 (“No State shall . . . impair the Obligation of
Contracts.”).
15
See WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL at 212 (noting that the
“Contracts Clause was unambiguously designed to prevent the very legislative
intervention being challenged” in the case).
16
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 315, 415 (1816)
17
Home Bulding & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934).
18
WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL at 214.
19
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 448-49 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (“A provision of the
Constitution, it is hardly necessary to say, does not admit of two distinctly
opposite interpretations. It does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely
different thing at another time.”).
13
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According to Noah Feldman, Justice Hugo Black was the first
“to frame originalism as a definitive constitutional theory.”
Feldman calls Justice Black “the inventor of originalism.” 20
Justice Black called version his version of originalism “absolutist”
on the subject of individual rights. 21 Unlike the academics who
popularized originalism in the 1960s and 1970, he is generally
considered to have been a liberal Justice and often considered an
activist,22 in that he would not hesitate to vote down legislation that
violated his understanding of the Constitution’s meaning.23 While
he certainly adhered to the notion that fidelity to the written
NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 145 (2010).
21
The term derives from Black’s inaugural James Madison lecture at NYU in
1960 in which he stated, “It is my belief that there are ‘absolutes’ in our Bill of
Rights, and that they were put there by men who knew what words meant, and
meant their prohibitions to be ‘absolute.’” ROBERT K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK:
A BIOGRAPHY 492 (1994); See also HOWARD BALL, HUGO L. BLACK: COLD
STEEL WARRIOR 122-123 (stressing Justice Black’s belief in the need for courts
to invalidate legislative enactments that threatened individual liberties).
22
See Arthur J. Goldberg, Attorney General Meese vs. Chief Justice John
Marshall and Justice Hugo L. Black, 185, 193, in JUSTICE HUGO BLACK AND
MODERN AMERICA (Tony Freyer, ed., 1990) [hereinafer FREYER] (calling into
question characterizations of Justices as “liberal” or “conservative” but referring
to Justice Black as “that outstanding ‘liberal’ jurist”); Akhil Amar, America's
Constitution and the Yale School of Constitutional Interpretation, 115 YALE L.J.
1997, 2008 n.33 (2006) (describing Justice Black as “a liberal lion and a
confessed textualist-originalist”). Justice Black himself would not have
appreciated the “activist” label. He considered the Lochner era, during which
the courts struck down business regulation, as a regrettable period of activism.
See Goldberg, in FREYER, at 193 (citing Justice Black’s opinion in Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372, U.S. 726, 731-32)).
23
Some prominent example of Justice Black’s use of originalism include: In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (contending that the
Constitution does not require that states apply the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard in criminal cases); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 7-18 (1964)
(construing Article I, § 2 of the Constitution, with the help of historical materials
from the period of the 1787 Constitutional Convention, to require that electoral
districts have similar populations within a given state); Adamson v. Califfornia,
332 U.S. 46, 74-78, 92-122 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (contending that the
14th Amendment was intended to make the Bill of Rights applicable against the
States and appending an appendix chronicling the Amendment’s history). See
also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 2 (1980) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST] (recognizing Justice
Black as the quintessential originalist).
20
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constitution was a mechanism for restraining judicial activism,24
his voting record is hard to reconcile with some versions of
contemporary originalism. 25 Moreover, he was an outlier in his
jurisprudential approach throughout his time on the Court. His
originalism did not sway others.26
The current vogue for originalism thus did not originate in the
minds of our 18th-century Framers.27 Leaders of the new Republic
did not contemplate originalism for many reasons, but the most
obvious is that the source materials that make originalism possible
were not available to them. George Washington held on to the
official record of the debates, which is incomplete, and eventually
handed them over to John Quincy Adams, who published them in
1819. 28 That document was edited and more widely circulated in
1830.29 James Madison’s influential account of the Constitutional

24

See NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK, at 349 (describing the aim of limiting judicial
discretion as being the root of Justice Black’s judicial tree).
25
See Goldberg, Attorney General Meese, at 185-89 (contrasting Attorney
General Meese’s originalist opposition to incorporation through the 14 th
Amendment with Justice Black’s originalist insistence on incorporation).
26
See Anthony Lewis, Justice Black and the First Amendment, in FREYER, at
237, 237-38 (suggesting that Justice Black wrote for the majority in only one
First Amendment case); id. at 251 (“The fact is Justice Black’s oft-proclaimed
belief in First Amendment absolutes never commended itself to a majroity of his
colleagues.”).
27
See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
1185, 1194–96 (noting that various contemporary methods of non-originalist
constitutional interpretation are rooted in traditions that extend back to the time
of the adoption of the Constitution and were employed by Justice John
Marshall); Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV. J.
L. PUB. POL’Y 907, 908 (2008) (citing Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment:
It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6) (2006)) (“The idea of originalism
as an exclusive theory, as the criterion for measuring constitutional decisions,
ermeged only in the 1970s and 1980s.”); Keith E. Whittington, The New
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 (2004) (conceding that, for
much of U.S. history, originalism “was not a terribly self-conscious theory of
constitutional interpretation”).
28
See Mary Sarah Bilder, How Bad Were the Official Records of the Federal
Convention? 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1620, 1663-1680 (2012) (recounting
batlles during the Washington administration over the meaning of the
Constitution and the struggle over the extent to which the men involved in the
Convention could rely on the written record of that Convention).
29
Id. at 1623.
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Convention was first published in 1840. 30 The first scholarly
edition of the Convention did not appear until 1911.31 Powerful
criticisms have been raised with respect to the accuracy of
Madison’s account32 and as to the scholarly neglect of the official
records of the Constitutional Convention. 33 Such accounts are
most relevant to intentionalists and since, as we shall see, most
21st-century originalists are more concerned with original public
meaning than they are with original intent, the more important
documents relate not to the drafting of the Constitution in
Philadelphia but to its ratification in the several States.
But there the situation is no better. The first comprehensive
scholarly account of the ratification was published in 2010. 34
Even today, the documentary record relating to ratification is
incomplete. 35 We have detailed records of some ratification
assemblies and almost none relating to others. 36 The situation for
the Bill of Rights is far worse, as the final text was the product of a

30

JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Gordon
Lloyd, ed., 2015).
31
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
32
See MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (2015) (contending that Madison revised his
account of the Convention in the years after the Convention to reflect his
evolving views of the Constitution in action and of the men responsible for
drafting it).
33
See Bilder, How Bad? 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. at 1623 (2012) (defending the
usefulness of the official records and the competence of the recording secretary
against Max Farrand’s assessment that the records are flawed and the secretary
incompetentd).
34
PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION
1787-1788 (2010). See id. at x (discussing previous scholarship on ratification,
the best of which consisted of two edited collections that appeared in 1988 and
1989 but which devoted separate chapters to the ratification process in each state
and thus missed part of the story).
35
See id. at xiii-xiv (describing the way Federalists conspired to create a onesided record of the ratification debates that favored their perspective).
36
See id. at xii (noting that in the 21-volume collection, The Documentary
History of the Ratification of the Constitution, the records for Delaware, New
Jersey, Georgia and Connecticut take up one volume, while four volumes are
devoted to Virginia and five to New York).
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committee that kept no minutes of its proceedings and of a vote in
the Senate, whose deliberations were secret by design.37
If it claims to be the original understanding of the Framers,
originalism is a twentieth-century invention, not without its
historical antecedents, but not realized as a comprehensive
approach to interpretation until about 200 years after the Framing.
Justice Scalia acknowledged as much:
It would be hard to count on the fingers of both hands and the
toes of both feet, yea, even on the hairs of one's youthful head,
the opinions that have in fact been rendered not on the basis of
what the Constitution originally meant, but on the basis of what
the judges currently thought it desirable for it to mean.38

We do not even know whether the Framers, had the question been
put to them, would have wanted their intentions or their
understandings to govern our approach to constitutional
conundrums that the Framers could not have contemplated. That
is, we do not know whether originalism was originally intended.

B.

From Intentionalism to Textualism

Scholarship on originalism in constitutional interpretation
routinely notes one important development of originalist theory.
Early originalist scholars saw it as their task to divine the
intentions of the drafters of the Constitution. Later originalists
shifted their focus to the understandings of the men who ratified
it. Finally, textualist originalists attempt to discern the original
public meaning of the document as adopted; that is, these
textualists maintain that the Constitution ought to be understood as

37

See RICHARD LABUNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BILL
RIGHTS 234 (2006) (noting that “little is known about the debate” in the
Senate that winnowed the Bill of Rights down from 17 Amendments to 12
because “the Senate met behind closed doors until 1794, and thus the record of
their discussion is sparce”).
38
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U CIN. L. Rev. 849, 852
(1989).
OF
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meaning what its original intended audience understood it to
mean.39
Originalism, as an academic movement in constitutional
interpretation with a popular following, began as a response to the
Warren and Burger Courts. 40 Judge Robert Bork’s contribution
was to expand upon Herbert Wechsler’s “neutral principles”
approach. In Bork’s view, the judge’s task was to apply “neutral
principles” articulated in the Constitution. 41 Originalism was at
this point a reactive theory that sought to reign in judicial activism
by forcing judicial attention to the original meaning of the
Constitution.42 As Judge Bork explained,
Though there have been instances of judicial perversity
throughout our history, nothing prepared us for the sustained
radicalism of the Warren Court, its wholesale subordination of
law to an egalitarian politics that, by deforming both the

39

For excellent, succinct summaries covering the history of originalism, see
Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611,
611–29 (1999); Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment and the
False Promise of Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 530–33 (2008); Keith
E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599-603
(2004); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed,
49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989).
40
Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. at 1188; see also
Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L. J. 239, 247
(2009) (explaining that the “sweeping decisions of the Warren Court” led
conservatives to insist that “the Constitution be interpreted to give effect to the
intent of the framers”); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political
Practice: The Right's Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 550-54
(2006) (describing modern conservative jurisprudential thought as a response to
the judicial activism of the liberal Warren Court). John Hart Ely makes the
more precise claim that the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade forced
constitutional law professors to decide where they stood in relation to the
division between originalists and non-originalists. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST,
at 2-3.
41
See, e.g. Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1 (1971) (reflecting on the implications of Wechsler’s
concept of neutral principles and applying that concept to some First
Amendment issues).
42
See id. at 4-6 (criticizing Judge Wright and the claim that the Supreme Court
must unavoidably make fundamental value choices in interpreting the
Constitution).
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Constitution and statutes, reordered our politics and our
society.43

Given the focus of early originalism on the Supreme Court’s
perceived liberal, judicial activism, originalism had a clear, if
purely negative, political agenda, and it assumed that its agenda
could be realized if judges respected the wills of legislatures. 44
Early academic practitioners of originalism described their
project as one of fidelity to the original intentions of the Framers.45
Although contemporary academic and judicial originalists
sometimes lapse into the language of intentions, 46 originalism
largely abandoned the intentionalist project in the 1980s, when
legal scholars published compelling criticisms of the original
intentions approach.47 Stanford Law School’s Paul Brest exposed
43

Robert Bork, Introduction, in A COUNTRY, at ix, ix-x.
Dennis Goldford provides a nuaned reading of the relationship between
political conservatism and originalism. He concedes that originalism was a
conservative reaction to the perceived liberalism of the Warren and Burger
Courts but rejects the notion that originalism and the principle of judicial
restraint could be tied to any particular political ideology. DENNIS J. GOLDFORD,
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM 20-54
(2005). Raoul Berger, one of the leading academic originalisms of the 1960s and
70s, was a principled originalist who abhorred judicial activism, but he did not
have a political axe to grind. He may well have agreed with the politics of the
Warren and Burger Courts but he opposed government by judiciary. For an
appreciation of Berger’s work and of his enduring influence, see Jonathan G.
O’Neill, Raoul Berger and the Restoration of Originalism, 96 NORTHWESTERN
L. REV. 253 (2001).
45
See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 364 (1977) (contending
that any jurisprudence not bound by original intent amounts to judicial rewriting of the Constitution); Edwin Meese, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original
Intent, 11 HARV. J. L & PUB. POL’Y 5 (1988) (; Robert H. Bork, The
Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823,
823 (1986) (“original intent is the only legitimate basis for constitutional
decisionmaking.”).
46
See Clarence Thomas, How to Read the Constitution, excerpt from the 2008
Wriston Lecture delivered to the Manhanttan Institute, in THE WALL ST. J. (Oct.
20, 2008), at A19 (“[T]here are really only two ways to interpret the
Constitution – try to discern as best we can what the framers intended or make it
up.”).
47
See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV.
611, 611-12 (1999) (describing the original intentions approach as having been
44
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the extraordinary difficulty in reconstructing the Framers’ original
intentions with respect to any particular constitutional provision,48
a very strong position, given the state of historical research at the
time. Brest’s critique established the foundations for the
“instability thesis,” that is, the idea that the contestations that
emerge from the historical record render futile originalism’s
attempts to fix constitutional meaning.49
It is very difficult to know the intentions of the Framers,
beyond what we can discern from the text itself, based on the
legislative history of the Constitution. The complex ratification
process involved hundreds of actors, and records of the ratification
process are spotty at best. 50 However, some contemporary
originalists are increasingly confident of our ability to discern the
“trounced” by its critics); id. at 613 (“If ever a theory had a stake driven through
its heart, it seems to be originalism.”).
48
See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U. L. REV. 204, 222 (1980) (concluding that an “interpreter’s understanding of
the original understanding may be so indeterminate as to undermine the
rationale for originalism” in the case of many controversial constitutional
provisions).
49
See, e.g., DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE
DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM 146-49 (2005) (discussing both empirical and
theoretical difficulties with the attempt to reconstruct the intention of the
Framers); Patrick J. Charles, History in Law, Mythmaking, and Constitutional
Legitimacy, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23, 26-27 (2014) (describing historians as
having exposed original intents originalism as an instance of the pathetic fallacy
and pointing out that the move to textualism does little to prevent subjective
outcomes); Joel Alicea & Donald L. Drakeman, The Limits of the New
Originalism, 15 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 1161, 1170-82 (2013) (using the early
case of United States v. Hylton to demonstrate the varied understandings among
the Framers of the meaning of “excise tax”).
50
See PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION
1787-1788 122-23 (2010) (describing the journal of the New Jersey ratifying
convention as not “very revealing” and noting that “[t]here were no published
debates or newspaper accounts of the New Jersey convention”); id. at 124
(observing that Georgia unanimously ratified the Constitution after one day of
deliberations and that the journal of those deliberations records only the result
with no explanation); id. at 457 (obvserving that “[n]o record survives of the
debates at Fayetteville, . . . ” where North Carolina held its ratifying
convention). Delaware approved the Constitution unanimously after a four-day
convention. Id. at 122. Records are so spotty that Pauline Maier mentions
Delaware on only eight pages in her 500-page history of ratification, and she
recounts the ratification on only one of those pages. Id.

13

original understanding of the Constitution through the use of
computer-assisted research techniques.51
Duke Law’s H. Jefferson Powell emphasized the framers’
reluctance to have interpretations of the Constitution depend on
claimed knowledge of their own original intentions.52 Anticipating
contemporary textualism, Powell argued that in the early Republic,
references to “intention” were akin to the common law tradition
whereby one discerns the intention of a legal text from the text
itself. 53 Joseph Ellis concludes that the Constitution does not
embody “timeless truths” and that the Framers’ humility, in
knowing that they did not have all the answers, has enabled their
Constitution to survive. 54 They aimed instead to “provide a
political platform wide enough to allow for considerable latitude
within which future generations could make their own
decisions.”55 According to Ellis, Jefferson spoke for of the most
prominent Framers when he urged that constitutions ought not be
51

See Lee Strang, Blunting the Instability Critique: Original Meaning
Originalism and
Computer-Assisted
Research
Techniques,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2665131
(arguing
that
computer-assisted research techniques enables originalism to overcome the
instability thesis); Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of
the Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847 (2003) (reviewing all instances of
the word “commerce” in the Pennsylvania Gazette from 1720-1800 and finding
that the word’s conventional meaning is relatively narrow, connoting only
“trade” or “exchange”); but see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of Interpreting
the Commerce Clause: A Comparative Analysis, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1185, 11991200 (2003) (noting a broader understanding of the term “commerce” in
writings, such as those of Adam Smith and Daniel Defoe with which the
Framers were familiar and that some Framers express broader understandings of
“commerce” at the Convention itself).
52
See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885, 906-07 (1985) (pointing out the Federalists’ view that the
intentions of the drafters of the Constitution would not be legally relevant
because they were “mere scriveners” appointed to draft an instrument for the
people).
53
See id. at 895-902 (describing the evolution of the objective apporach to
common law interpretation in which one gave effect to the will of the parties to
a contract or the drafters of the statute through interpretation of the text intended
to give expression of those wills)
54
JOSEPH J. ELLIS, THE QUARTET: ORCHESTRATING THE SECOND AMERICAN
REVOLUSION, 1781-1789 218 (2015) [hereinafer ELLIS, THE QUARTET].
55
Id. at 219.
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regarded with “sanctimonious reverence” and that law and
institutions must develop “hand in hand with the progress of the
human mind.” 56 Statements by the drafters as to their intentions
formed no part of 18th- or early 19th-century attempts to discern the
Constitution’s meaning.57
In response to critiques of intentionalism, originalists refined
their methodology and shifted their focus from the original
intentions of the Constitution’s drafters to the understandings of
the men who ratified it, as a shorthand for the original public
understanding of the constitution’s text.58 This made more sense,
because we are less interested in what the Framers thought they
were saying at the constitutional convention in Philadelphia than
we are with what those who voted for ratification in the thirteen
separate ratification processes thought they were agreeing to. 59
From there, the shift to textualist originalism was not far. Justice
Scalia is largely credited with spearheading the shift in the
originalist movement from intentionalism to textualism – that is,
the shift from a focus on the intent of the drafters or ratifiers of the
Constitution to a focus on the original public meaning of the
document as it would have been understood by educated people
living in the late 18th century.60 We care about that understanding
56

See id. at 219-20 (quoting a letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel
Kercheval, wirtten July 12, 1816 and conveniently available in The Portable
Thomas Jefferson 558-59 (Merrill D. Peterson, ed., 1975).
57
See Powell, 98 HARV. L. REV. at 888 (“This original ‘original intent’ was
determined not by historical inquiry into the expectations of the individuals
involved in framing and ratifying the Constitution . . .”).
58
See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144 (1990) (clarifying that the search for the original
meaning is not the search for the drafters subjective intention but for “what the
public of that time would have understood the words to mean”).
59
See Powell, 98 HARV. L. REV. at 888 (“To the extent that constitutional
interpreters considered historical evidence to have any interpretive value, what
they deemed relevant was evidence of the proceedings of the state ratifying
conventions, not of the intent of the framers.”); Charles Lofgren, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 77, 79 (1988)
(contending that the Framers “were clearly hospitable to the use of original
intent in the sense of ratifier intent, which is the original intent in a
constitutional sense”).
60
See Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of ”Faint-Hearted”
Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 9 (2006) (“Justice Scalia was perhaps the first
defender of originalism to shift the theory from its previous focus on the
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because the ratification process was a founding moment, at which
the states through their representatives (eventually) all agreed to
bind their wills through a common text. 61 So what judges ought to
be trying to reconstruct is not what the drafters thought they said
but what a reasonable, educated person would have understood the
constitutional text to mean.
We have now come full circle, with a group of originalist
scholars embracing the intentionalist label in full awareness of the
debate over its adequacy. 62 In fact, the difference between
textualist approaches or original-public-meaning approaches and
intentionalist originalism should not be overstated. Regardless of
nomenclature, originalists of all stripes consult the same sources in
determining the meaning of the text. 63 The Framers whose
intentions of the framers of the Constitution to the original public meaning of
the text at the time of its enactment.”); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and
Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 554-55 (2003) (crediting
Justice Scalia with the suggestion, accepted by most originalists, to change the
label of the doctrine from original intent to original meaning).
61
See Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 411, 417-18 (2013) (articulating new originalism’s normative claim that
original meaning should presumptively govern constitutional interpretation).
62
See e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL
REASONING 131-232 (2008) (elaborated a theory of interpretation whose goal is
to capture the lawmaker’s intended meaning). Others, while not embracing
intentionalism, have pointed out that the new originalism fares not better in its
attempts to escape the subjectivism associated with non-originalist mechanisms
of constitutional interpretation; Heidi M. Hurd, Why Would Anyone Care About
Original
Intent?
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2612115 at 4-5 (contending
that if Alexander and Sherwin’s defense of intentionalism fails, other versions of
originalism are unlikely to be more persuasive); Joel Alicea & Donald L.
Drakeman, The Limits of the New Originalism, 15 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 1161,
1208-09 (2013) (advocating a “descriptivist” version of intentionalism and
permitting courts to allow the Framers’ intention to break “ties” when original
public meaning is unclear ); Tara Smith, Originalism’s Misplaced Fidelity:
“Original” Meaning Is Not Objective, 26 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 1,
55-56 (2009) (concluding that both original public understanding approaches
and Randy Barnett’s attempt to ground origianlism in the importance of the
“writtenness” of the constitution fail to escape subjectivism).
63
See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO.
L.J. 713, 741-42 (2011) (noting that even so-called New Originalists concede
that recourse to evidence of original intent or original expected applications is
the best method for establishing original public meaning); Richard S. Kay,
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intentions shaped the text were among the most prolific writers
who opined on the text’s meaning and thus provided evidence of
the Constitution’s original public meaning. They also often
numbered among the ratifiers, whose understanding of the text
matters the most.64
In this context, it is worth noting that the leading historians of
the founding period, including Gordon Wood and Jack Rakove, are
not originalists. 65 Joseph J. Ellis, a Pulitzer Prize-winning
historian who has written nine books about the founding era,
decries the pointlessness of trying to imagine what George
Washington’s view might be of contemporary constitutional
Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103
NW. L. REV. 703, 712-13 (2009) (concluding that the public meaning of the
constitutional text almost always follows the intentions of those who drafted and
adopted it).
64
See, e.g., SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS 79 n.1 (2007) (“The distinction
between intention and meaning is a refinement that cuts no ice with us.”); Henry
P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 375 n.130
(1981) (“[T]he difficulties of ascertaining the intent of the ratifiers leaves little
choice but to accept the intent of the Framers as a fair reflection of it.”); Caleb
Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 557
(2003) (pointing out that original intent and original meaning most likely align
in most cases and where they do not, modern readers are not well positioned to
discern original meaning).
65
See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 6 (1996) (calling the idea that the Constitution
had a fixed meaning at the time it was adopted “a mirage”); Gordon S. Wood,
The Supreme Court and the Uses of History, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 435, 443-44
(2013) (distinguishing real history from “law office history” or “history lite” and
arguing that no historian who wants to maintain her reputation among her peers
should engage in the latter); Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the
Constitution, or, the Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 575, 578-79 (2011)(“Historical answers may be just as indeterminate as
other forms of legal reasoning, allowing judges to pick and choose the evidence
that satisfies their predispositions.”); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson,
Essay, Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy Relationship, 18 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 155, 165 (2006) (noting that most academics with degrees in both law
and history are “highly skeptical” of originalism because they tend to have more
nuanced views of history events); Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the
Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV.
349, 351-58 (1989) (marshaling evidence that the Framers did not intend for the
Constitution to be interpreted according to their intentions and raising questions
about who should be included among “the Framers”).
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controversies. He compares the exercise to “planting cut
flowers.”66 Ellis concludes his most recent book by noting that the
one original intention that the Framers all shared “was opposition
to any judicial doctrine of ‘original intent.’” The Framers wished
to be remembered, Ellis concedes, “but they did not wish to be
embalmed.”67

C.

The Return of Originalist Judicial
Activism

There is a second development in originalist theory that is at least
as significant as the move from intentionalism to
textualism. Originalism began in the 1960s as a theory of judicial
humility. As Thomas Colby put it, “Originalism was born of a
desire to constrain judges. Judicial constraint was its heart and
soul—its raison d’être.”68 It was a response to what was at the
time regarded as a period of unprecedented judicial
activism. Today, originalism thrives as a far more robust,
sophisticated and self-confident theory that contemporary judges
may overrule legislative enactments and court precedents based on
originalist methods, which may be intentionalist or textualist, as
the occasion dictates.69 Originalism now enacts judicial activism
rather than resisting it.70
Just to take a few examples: the Supreme Court recently
recognized for the first time that the Second Amendment protects
66

ELLIS, THE QUARTET, at xvii.
Id. at 220.
68
Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. at 714.
69
See Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 411, 420-32 (2013) (arguing that, even where recent Supreme Court
cases were decided on other grounds, originalism still exerts a “gravitational
force” influencing those opinions).
70
See, e.g., Eric J Segall, The Constitution According to Justices Scalia and
Thomas: Alive and Kickin’” 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1663 (2014) (discussing
recent constitutional decisions in which Justices Scalia and Thomas have voted
to overturn precedent or struck down legislation); Colby, The Sacrifice of the
New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. at 714-15 (noting that the “new originalism” has
abandoned the emphasis on judicial constraint that inspired its original
popularity); Geoffrey Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and the Future of
Constitutional Law, 82 TULANE L. REV. 1533, 1548 (2008) (noting that
originalism can be passivist or activist and criticizing the Roberts Court for
ignoring precedent).
67
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an individual right to bear arms and struck down state 71 and
federal 72 gun control enactments that had been in place for
decades. 73 In so doing, the Court overturned 70-year-old
constitutional precedent (a McReynolds opinion, no less) that had
specifically rejected the claim that the Second Amendment
protected an individual right to bear arms outside the context of a
well-regulated militia, 74 and which had been subsequently relied
on in hundreds of cases.75
In its first Obamacare decision, 76 the Supreme Court was
willing to draw on originalist jurisprudence77 and set aside decades
of precedent during which the scope of Congress’s powers under

71

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010)
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008)
73
See McDonald, 130 S.Ct at 3026 (noting that Chicago’s ordinance that was
challenged in the case dated from 1982); Heller 128 S.Ct. at 2854 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the original version of the challenged legislation, which
was passed in 1976).
74
See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174. 178 (“In the absence of any
evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of
less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship
to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that
the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an
instrument.”).
75
See Heller 128 U.S. at 2823 * n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing cases and
noting that until a Fifth Circuit decision in 2001, every Circuit Court had
followed Miller in holding that the Second Amendment does not protect an
individual right to possess and use weapons for private purposes).
76
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sibelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566
(2012).
77
See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE TOUGH LUCK CONSTITUTION AND THE
ASSAULT ON HEALTH CARE REFORM 114 (2013) (specifying Chief Justice
Roberts’ unacknowledged reliance on Gary Lawson and David Kopels’ narrow
reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause based on historical evidence from
the eighteenth century); id. at 118 (characterizing the opinion of the dissenting
Justices who joined in Justice Scalia’s opinion as adopting an interpretation of
the Necessary and Proper Clause that Justice Marshall specifically rejected in
McCulloch v. Maryland); Randy Barnett, A weird victory for federalism,
SCOTUSblog
(June
28,
2012),
available
at
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/a-weird-victory-for-federalism/
(proclaiming that the Court had “accepted all of our arguments” in adopting the
novel action/inaction distinction in NFIB v. Sibelius).
72
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the Commerce Clause was nearly unfettered. 78 The Court first
began its retreat from deference in 1995 with United States v.
Lopez,79 but in all but one of the cases in which the Court struck
down laws as exceeding Congress’s Commerce Clause powers, it
did so by a 5-4 votes with the Court’s five most conservative
Justices in the majority. In so doing the Justices “most commonly
associated with advocating judicial restraint . . . abandoned almost
60 years of deference to the legislature under the commerce
clause.”80
Finally, in Citizens United,81 the Court ordered rehearing and
decided issues that were not raised in the first oral argument before
it in the case.82 It then overturned recent precedent and invalidated
long-standing campaign finance regulation. 83 All of these
decisions might be on solid ground and well reasoned, but they are
not the actions of a minimalist court. As a result, some originalists
see in its moment of triumph, especially in the context of the
Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence, the seeds of
corruption.84

III. Originalism as Inescapable and Doomed
It is now very difficult to imagine or to defend a theory of
constitutional interpretation that would be indifferent to the
original meaning of the text. Thus some proponents of originalism

78

See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
262-71 (5th ed. 2015) (discussing the Court’s extremely broad understanding of
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers between 1937 and 1995).
79
514 U.S. 549 (1995)
80
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 281.
81
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
82
See Jeffrey Toobin, Annals of Law, Money Unlimited: How Chief Justice John
Roberts orchestrated the Citizens United decision, THE NEW YORKER (May 21,
2012), available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/05/21/moneyunlimited.
83
See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct at 886 (2010) (holding that the doctrine of stare
decisis does not compel adherence to Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce
(1990) or McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003)).
84
See J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Of Guns, Abortions and the Unraveling Rule of
Law, 95 VIRG. L. REV. 253 (2009) (likening the activism informing the Heller
decision to that of Roe v. Wade).
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have confidently declared that we are all originalists now.85 And
both originalism and originalists have made great advances.
Originalism has largely addressed the concerns of its early critics,
and as a result it has become a far more robust interpretive
approach. As more and more legal scholars engage in originalist
research, the amount of information we have about the background
to the Constitution steadily grows. This historical research into
original intent and original meaning in turn informs judicial
opinions and scholarship, effecting a fundamental reorientation of
the interpretive task.
The last few decades have produced an incredible outpouring
of high-quality legal-historical scholarship. As a result, originalists
can now claim much greater and more specific knowledge of the
original meaning of, sampling just some of the recent scholarship:
the Commerce Clause; 86 the Necessary and Proper Clause; 87
foreign affairs; 88 the scope of Executive power; 89 Article IV’s
Privileges and Immunities Clause; 90 the Supremacy Clause; 91
85

ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL
ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1 (2011).
86
Mark R. Killenbeck, The Original(?), Public(?) Meaning of “Commerce”, 16
J. CONST. L. 289 (2013); Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin’s Interaction Theory of
“Commerce”, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 623; Randy E. Barnett, The Original
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001)
87
GARY LAWSON, ET AL., THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE
(2010); John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L. J. 1045
(2014); John T. Valauri, Originalism and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 39
O.N.U. L. REV. 773 (2013); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183 (2003).
88
MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(2007). Ingrid Wuerth, An Originalism for Foreign Affairs? 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.
J. 5 (2008).
89
ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER
THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010); David Fontana, The Second American
Revolution in the Separation of Powers, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1409 (2009); Robert G.
Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Constitution’s “Executive Vesting
Clause”—Evidence from Eighteenth-Century Drafting Practice, 31 WHITTIER L.
REV. 1 (2009).
90
Stewart Jay, Origins of the Privileges and Immunities of State Citizenship
under Article IV, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 1 (2013); Robert G. Natelson, The
Original Meaning of the Privilges and Immunities Clause, 43 GA. L. REV. 1117
(2009); Kenyon D. Bunch, The Original Understanding of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause: Michael Perry's Justification For Judicial Activism Or
Robert Bork’s Constitutional Inkblot? 10 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 321 (2000).
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foreign affairs;92 the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause;93 the
First Amendment’s religion clauses; 94 the Second Amendment;95
the Fourth Amendment;96 the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’

91

Michael D. Ramsey, The Supremacy Clause, Original Meaning, and Modern
Law, 74 OH. ST. L. J. 559 (2013); Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause
Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731 (2010); D. A. Jeremy Telman, Medellín
and Originalism, 68 MD. L. REV. 377 (2009); Martin S. Flaherty, History
Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as
“Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999); John C. Yoo,
Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original
Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The
Four Doctrines of Self Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695 (1995).
92
MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(2007). Ingrid Wuerth, An Originalism for Foreign Affairs? 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.
J. 5 (2008).
93
Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable
Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L. J. 1 (2011); Eugene
Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the Original Meaning of the First
Amendment, 97 GEO. L. J. 1057 (2009);
94
Carl H. Esbeck, Uses and Abuses of Textualism and Originalism in
Establishment Clause Interpretation, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 489; Andrew
Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 727 (2009); Vincent Philip Munoz, The Original Meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause: The Evidence from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1083 (2008); Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the
Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346 (2002); Michael W. McConnell,
The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1416 (1990).
95
Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence,
56 UCLA L. REV. 1343 (2009); David Thomas Konig, Why the Second
Amendment Has a Preamble: Original Public Meaning and the Political Culture
of Written Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295
(2009); Nathan Kozuskanich, Originalism, History and the Second Amendment:
What Did Bearing Arms Really Mean to the Founders? 10 J. CONST. L. 413
(2008); Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early
American Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487 (2004); Saul
Cornell, Commonplace Or Anachronism: The Standard Model, the Second
Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional
Theory, 16 CONST. COMM. 221 (1999).
96
Fabio Arcilo, Jr., A Response to Professor Steinberg’s Fourth Amendment
Chutzpah, 10 U. PA. J. CONST L. 1229 (2008); David E. Steinberg, The Uses and
Misuses of Fourth Amendment History, 10 U. PA. J. CONST L. 581 (2008); Akhil
Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment, First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757
(1994); David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (2000).
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Due Process Clauses; 97 the Eight Amendment; 98 the Ninth
Amendment; 99 the Tenth Amendment; 100 the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause; 101 and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause. 102 Judges who
want to give originalist interpretations to specific constitutional
clauses can now draw on this extremely rich trove of research in
order to do so.

97

Natalie M. Banta, Substantive Due Process in Exile: The Supreme
Court’s Original Interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 13 WYO. L. REV. 151 (2013); Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only
Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408 (2010); Lawrence
Rosenthal,
Does Due Process Have
an Original Meaning?
On
Originalism, Due Process, Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking Tickets, 60
OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2007); Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due Process: the
Original Understanding, 4 CONST. COMM. 339 (1987).
98
John Stinneford, Death, Desuetude, and Original Meaning, 56 WM & MARY
L. REV. 531 (2014); John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”:
The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739,
(2008).
99
Michael W. McConnell, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment: How Does
Lockean Legal Theory Assist in Interpretation? 5 NYU J. L. & LIB. 1(2010);
Michael W. McConnell, The Ninth Amendment in Light of Text and History,
2009-10 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 13; Kurt T. Lash, Three Myths of the Ninth
Amendment, 56 Drake L. Rev. 875 (2008).
100
Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth Amendment,
Popular Sovereignty and “Expressly” Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1889 (2008); Gary Lawson, A Truism with Attitude: The Tenth Amendment
in Constitutional Context, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469 (2008).
101
Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Colorblind Constitution, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 71 (2013); Chistropher R. Green, The Original Sense of
the (Equal) Protection Clause: Subsequent Interpretation and Application, 19
GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 219 (2009); Christopher R. Green, The Original
Sense Of The (Equal) Protection Clause: Pre-Enactment History, 19 GEO.
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1 (2008); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the
Desegregation Decisions, 81 VIRG. L. REV. 947 (1995).
102
Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part III:
Andrew Johnson and the Constitutional Referendum of 1866, 101 GEO. L. J.
1275 (2013); Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
Part II: John Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99
GEO. L.J. 329, 337 (2011); Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges and Immunities” as an Antebellum Term
of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241 (2010); Phillip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities,
105 NW. L. REV. 61 (2011).
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Nonetheless, our attempts to discern the original meaning have
not produced greater certainty or predictability in constitutional
interpretation, which is still claimed as one of the advantages of the
originalist approach.103 In Heller, the majority and the dissent used
nearly identical interpretive methods to arrive at opposite
conclusions regarding the meaning of the Second Amendment.104
Self-proclaimed originalists are divided on every conceivable
issue,105 as is clear from the number of times that Justice Thomas
has written separately from Justice Scalia often only to arrive at the
same conclusion by a separate originalist path.106

103

See, e.g. Richard S. Kay, Adherence to Original Intentions in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. L. REV. 226, 286-87
(1988) (defending originalism as “about as stable and objective as human beings
can contrive while still working with a constitution sufficiently complex to be a
workable instrument of government”); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for
Non-Originalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 641 (1999) (linking the legitimacy of a
written constitution to the fact that its provisions will be respected over time).
104
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008).
105
See, e.g. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial
Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the
Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1282 (1997) (finding historical
support for a range of views on the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause). Compare Frederick Mark Gedicks, An
Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law
Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 668–70 (2009)
(defending substantive due process as consistent with public meaning
originalism) with John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional
Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 542–55 (1997) (questioning the propriety of
substantive due process based on an examination of the historical record).
Compare ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 39, 166 (1990) (declaring the meaning the Privileges
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Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 663, 694-95 (2009) (finding that the Privileges or Immunities
clause has a clear, specific meaning).
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See, e.g. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sibelius, 132 S.Ct.
2566, 2677 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (adhering to the view that “the very
notion of a ‘substantial effects’ test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent
with the original understanding of Congress' powers and with this Court’s early
Commerce Clause cases.”); Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2235 (2005)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (calling the “substantial effects” doctrine rootless because
tethered to neither the Commerce Clause nor the Necessary and Proper Clause);
United States v. Morrison, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 1759 (2000) (Thomas,J., concurring)
(writing separately to opine that precedents establishing Congress’s power to
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One critic of originalism has identified 72 different theoretical
strains within the originalist camp.107 That camp has become so
broad as to encompass the very people whom some originalists
identify as their arch-nemeses.108 And in some cases, originalists
add so many caveats to their insistence on originalism that they
end up sounding a lot like living constitutionalists.109 Moreover,
because of the adversarial nature of the common law, as Richard
Primus has pointed out, the more people become adept at
originalist arguments, the less helpful originalist arguments
become in adjudication.110

regulate economic activities that substantially affect interstate commerce should be
overturned) Lopez v, United States, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1642-43 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (same);. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876,

879 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting) (writing separately to insist
that the Constitution protects anonymous political speech); McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3058 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (rejecting the
majority’s substantive due process reasoning and finding that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause protects an individual right to
bear arms against state interference). See also Timothy Sandefur, Clarence
Thomas’s Jurisprudence Unexplained, 4 NYU J. L. & LIBERTY 535, 553 (2009)
(questioning why Justices Thomas and Scalia, both regarded as originalists, so
often differ on constitutional issues).
107
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009).
Berman does not number them. The tally is provided in James E. Fleming, The
Balkinization of Originalism, 2012 U. ILL L. REV. 669, 671; see also id. at 670
(contending that the only thing the various originalisms have in common is their
rejection of moral readings of the Constitution). Seee also Thomas B. Colby,
The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEORGETOWN L. J. 713, 716-36 (2011)
(discussing various strains within originalism, including original intent, original
meaning, subjective and objective meaning, actual and hypothetical
understanding, standards and general principles, differing levels of generality,
original expected application, original principles, interpretation, construction,
normative and semantic originalism).
108
See Keith E. Whittington, Dworkin’s “Originalism”: The Role of Intentions
in Constitutional Interpretation, 62 REV. POL. 197, 201 (2000) (construing
Ronald Dworkin’s approach as a commitment to the “abstract principles” that
the Founders wrote into the Constitution).
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See James E. Fleming, Are We All Origianlists Now? I Hope Not! 91 TEX L.
REV. 1785, 1796 (2013) (providing a quotation from Robert Bork in which he
incorporates positions that one more readily associates with Ronald Dworkin or
Jack Balkin).
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Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 165, 207 (2008).

25

There are some constitutional provisions with respect to which
we are all originalists. When it comes to the rule that the President
“shall have attained to the age of thirty-five Years,” 111 nobody
argues that this should be read to mean anything other than what it
meant to the Framers. There have been no serious attempts to
argue that, for example, because the Constitution is a living
document, and because life expectancy in the 18th century was
about 37 years, only people on death’s door should be eligible for
our nation’s highest office. 112 Similarly, when the Constitution
speaks of “domestic violence,” 113 we all understand that the
reference is to civil unrest and not to spousal abuse. 114 In such
contexts, if we want to be taken seriously, we are all originalists.
In other contexts, however, nobody can claim that all
constitutional difficulties can be resolved through originalist
interpretive methods, because some of our most fundamental
constitutional traditions have no textual basis. Thus the so-called
“new originalism” distinguishes between constitutional
interpretation and constitutional construction.
Constructions do not pursue a preexisting if deeply hidden
meaning in the founding document; rather, they elucidate the text
in the interstices of discoverable, interpretive meaning, where the
text is so broad or so underdetermined as to be incapable of
faithful but exhaustive reduction to legal rules.115

Keith Whittington has identified scores of fundamental institutions
that are integral to our actual, lived constitution but about which
111

U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1, ¶ 5.
See Andrew B. Coan, Talking Originalism, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 847, 850-51
(listing “precise” constitutional provisions about which there is no controversy,
including “the presidential age requirement, equal state representation in the
Senate, proportional representation in the House of Representatives, and the
procedures for appointing and confirming federal judges”).
113
U.S. Const., Art IV § 4.
114
See Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of New Originalism, 99 GEORGETOWN
L. J. 713, 753 (2011), but see Mark S. Stein, The Domestic Violence Clause in
“New Originalist” Theory, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 129, 133–35 (2009)
(arguing that a new originalist reading of the clause could permit such an
understanding of “domestic violence”).
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See KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 5 (1999)
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the Constitution itself is silent. These include what Whittington
calls “organic structures,” such as the various agencies of the
administrative state, the nine-Justice Supreme Court, the creation
of inferior courts and the President’s cabinet. 116 They also include
structures of political participation and citizenship structures, such
as the party system and voting processes. 117 Here, interestingly
enough, Whittington includes the regulation of campaign
finance, 118 which the Supreme Court has treated as an issue of
interpretation rather than construction.119 Whittington includes as
constitutional constructions principles of delegation and
distribution of federal powers, such as executive and
congressional/executive agreements and judicial review of
legislative enactments.120 He also includes economic infrastructural
elements, such as the federal reserve and the federal treasury,121 to
which we might add federal bankruptcy courts and the national
highway system. 122 Nobody can seriously claim that the
constitutional text can determine whether all of these things should
or should not be part of our constitutional system.123
In addition to the Constitution’s silences, there are also
numerous key constitutional words and phrases that defy clear
definition. These include, to name some of the Constitution’s
“majestic generalities”: 124 “due process of law,” 125 “equal
protection of the laws,”126 “cruel and unusual punishment,”127 and
“necessary and proper.” 128 As Randy Barnett, one of the most
116

Id. at 9-10, 12.
Id. at 10.
118
Id. at 12.
119
Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
120
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, at 12.
121
Id.
122
See id. at 11 (noting that his list of constitutional constructions only scratches
the surface but is intended to indicate their nature and range).
123
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persuasive originalists, concedes, there are times when we are
unable to discern what the constitutional meaning is, or as he puts
it, there are times when “constitutional meaning runs out.”129 To
some extent the difference between originalists and nonoriginalists are differences with regard to the frequency with which
original meaning runs out.
As a result, the difference between originalists and nonoriginalists is not that originalists think the constitutional text is
controlling and that non-originalists think that the constitutional
text is irrelevant. In almost all cases, contemporary judges faced
with a constitutional issue now start with an attempt to discern the
original meaning, and if the original meaning can be discerned, it
is controlling absent some strong reason to abandon it.130 Justice
Scalia has acknowledged that the differences between his own
originalism and moderate non-originalism are small and that most
non-originalists are moderate.131 As we shall see, although several
Justices have proclaimed themselves as adherents of originalism,
Justice Thomas is the only one who writes opinions in which he
arrives at a conclusion as to the Constitution’s original meaning

Originalism, 99 GEORGETOWN L. J. 713,
129
See Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 65, 69 (2011) (acknowledging that the meaning of the constitution
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what to do when original meaning runs out”); see also Lawrence B. Solum,
Semantic Originalism 19 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law Ill. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, No. 07-24, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id_1120244 (observing that
when the meaning of the constitutional text is underdetermined, original
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construction);.
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and then ends the analysis.132 But as Scott Gerber noted early on,
even Justice Thomas’s originalism is also not entirely consistent.133

IV. Two Originalist Approaches: Scalia and
Thomas
It is now time to look more closely at the methodologies of the
Supreme Court’s self-proclaimed originalist Justices. The two
men could not be more different in their temperaments. The
combative Justice Scalia has transformed oral arguments with his
frequent questions134 and made “vitriol” a featured component of
the Supreme Court Justices’ dissents. 135 Justice Thomas is the
quietest Justice.136 In 2013, Justice Thomas spoke from the bench
for the first time in seven years, but even then his comment was
not a question relating to the case but a joke at the expense of Yale
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Law School.137 However, like Justice Black, he is not afraid to
write separately to stand up for his principled version of
originalism in constitutional interpretation.

A. Justice Scalia: Originalism “Done Badly”
In his most extended essay on originalism, 138 Justice Scalia
recognized that the originalist enterprise really requires training in
historical research, a task for which most judges are ill prepared.139
Even a professional historian, Justice Scalia concedes, would need
more time to undertake the originalist task properly than a judge
typically has to decide a case. 140 Still, Justice Scalia wrote that
originalism is the best approach because any other approach would
involve judges deciding cases by their own lights rather than by the
lights of those who agreed to be bound by the Constitution’s
provisions.141 Even if determining the meaning of those provisions
is difficult for a judge, Justice Scalia concluded that a “thing worth
doing is worth doing badly.”142
Justice Scalia mentions that the statement comes from G.K.
Chesterton, but he does not mention that it comes from
Chesterton’s 1910 book, What’s Wrong with the World.143 Justice
Scalia would likely find much to admire in the book. To the extent
that Chesterton highlights a lot of things that are wrong with the
137
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139
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world, the book evokes a version of Catholic Romantic
Conservatism that would resonate with Justice Scalia.
However, context matters. The passage in question comes at
the end of a chapter in which Chesterton advocates separate and
decidedly distinct education for women.144 Here, I have to quote
Chesterton at length, both because I am happy to have the
opportunity to introduce him to new readers and because there is
no way to do justice to his manner of reasoning without extended
quotation.
There was a time when you and I and all of us were all very
close to God; so that even now the color of a pebble (or a
paint), the smell of a flower (or a firework), comes to our
hearts with a kind of authority and certainty; as if they were
fragments of a muddled message, or features of a forgotten
face. To pour that fiery simplicity upon the whole of life is
the only real aim of education; and closest to the child
comes the woman – she understands. To say what she
understands is beyond me; save only this, that it is not a
solemnity. Rather it is a towering levity, an uproarious
amateurishness of the universe, such as we felt when we
were little, and would as soon sing as garden, as soon paint
as run. To smatter the tongues of men and angels, to
dabble in the dreadful sciences, to juggle with pillars and
pyramids and toss up the planets like balls, this is that inner
audacity and indifference which the human soul, like a
conjurer catching oranges, must keep up forever. This is
that insanely frivolous thing we call sanity. And the
elegant female, drooping her ringlets over her water-colors,
knew it and acted on it. She was juggling with frantic and
flaming suns. She was maintaining the bold equilibrium of
inferiorities which is the most mysterious of superiorities
and perhaps the most unattainable. She was maintaining
the prime truth of woman, the universal mother: that if a
thing is worth doing, it is worth doing badly.145
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Id. at 197-99.
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This is an exquisite piece of writing, and it requires a lot of
unpacking. In what follows we focus only on the parts relevant to
Justice Scalia’s use of Chesterton.
One of Chesterton’s themes was the importance of maintaining
the distinction between professionals and amateurs, or between
generalists and specialists. 146 There are occasions in life when
men must adopt the role of experts and interact with others based
on the status attached to their qualifications as experts.147 But most
of the time, we partake of what Chesterton calls mankind’s
“comrade-like aspect.” 148 That is, we deal with one another as
peers pursuing a common interest. Chesterton supported an
educated amateurism, and viewed specialization as the “peculiar
peril” of his time giving rise to imperialism, tyranny and a host of
other evils.149
For women, he advocated only educated amateurism. 150
Indeed, as indicated in the passage quoted above, he thought that
women’s superiority lay precisely in their unconstrained
amateurism. He thought that women were the last link that men
had to a time when all of us could engage in civilized
amateurism.151 Indeed, it is clear from the passage quoted above
that Chesterton placed great stock in amateurism and regarding
146

See id. at 110-114 (lamenting specialization not only of human activities but
of things, while associating univeralism with religion and specialization with
separation and divorce); American Chesterton Society, A Thing Worth Doing,
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universality”).
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women as the guardians of the realm of amateurism. The most
important things in life are the things worth doing badly. In its
original context, Chesterton was advocating the raising and
educating of one’s own children – or at least, he argued that
women should raise and educate their own children, rather than
working and sending their children to daycare.152
Chesterton’s advice, quoted by Justice Scalia, applied to things
like writing one’s own love letters and blowing one’s own nose.
Such things, Chesterton argued, are worth doing badly. 153
However, Justice Scalia applies the motto to his activities as a
specialist. And there the motto does not inspire confidence.
Chesterton acknowledged the role of professions and understood
that specialists have to do their jobs well.
The democratic contention is that government (helping to rule
the tribe) is a thing like falling in love, and not a thing like
dropping into poetry. It is not something analogous to playing
the church organ, painting on vellum, discovering the North Pole
(that insidious habit), looping the loop, being Astronomer Royal,
and so on. For these things we do not wish a man to do at all
unless he does them well.154

While Chesterton clearly thinks that democratic government is a
thing of the common people, it should be clear that judicial
interpretation of the law is not the same as democratic government.
Justice Scalia could not claim that Supreme Court Justices act in
the comrade-like aspect and not as specialists. They are judges,
not jurors. Chesterton never intended his motto to be applied to a
brain surgeon, a mechanical engineer or a federal judge
If Justice Scalia has lost track of Chesterton’s argument in
What’s Wrong with the World, we need not be concerned that the
quoted aphorism comes in the context of an argument that would
flunk the sniff test of constitutional Equal Protection and in a book
See id. at 119 (arguing that “woman set to guard” two primary things: “one’s
own children, one’s own altar” and that women went wrong when they
transferred their “sacred stubbornness” for those things to the world of work).
153
See G.K. CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 83-84 (1933) (linking doing such things
for oneself to the common conception of democracy).
154
Id. at 83.
152
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that devotes one quarter of its pages to opposition to women’s
suffrage.155 Originalism need not entail a formalism that would
limit the meaning of the aphorism to Chesterton’s original
meaning. However, that context may matter to us a great deal if
Justice Scalia knew exactly the context in which the quotation
appears: that is, in a book in which Chesterton rails against
feminism, homosexuality, women’s suffrage, birth control, and
divorce, among other things.156 Perhaps Justice Scalia’s invocation
of Chesterton sotto vocce is a signal to those in the know that he
wishes that he could vent his frustrations on these topics as freely
as Chesterton did.
But again, context matters. Justice Scalia has ripped the
aphorism out of its context, much as common law judges are wont
to elevate dicta to holdings and reduce holdings to dicta when it
suits their purposes. The main problem with Justice Scalia’s use of
Chesterton’s aphorism is that it actually enacts what happens when
one does something worth doing – badly. Chesterton was not
advocating amateurism among professionals, and why on earth
would anybody recommend such a thing? Deciding cases is the
sort of activity about which Justice Thomas’s aphorism seems
better to apply.
What possible purpose is served by a
constitutional methodology that even a judge well-versed in the
law could only apply badly? Scalia has elided Chesterton’s binary
opposition between acceptable methods for professionals and for
amateurs, and in so doing he has imported the ethos of generalists
into a realm that should be reserved for specialists.

B.

Justice Thomas: Originalism “Done Right”

Being a Supreme Court Justice is something that even G.K.
Chesterton would want to see done right. But what does it mean to
do such a thing right? For Justices Thomas and Scalia, doing
155
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See id. at 9 (General Editors’ Introduction) (“[Chesterton] knew that relaxed
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constitutional adjudication right involves originalism, but for
reasons discussed above in Part III, doing originalism right is
challenging. This brief discussion of Justice Thomas illustrates the
interpretive challenges raised by Justice Thomas’s principled
originalism.
Justice Thomas invokes the slogan “any job worth doing is
worth doing right” twice in his autobiography. 157 The first
iteration comes when Justice Thomas is describing the refusal of
his revered grandfather (to whom Justice Thomas refers as
“Daddy”) to demonstrate any warmth or affection for Thomas or
his brother, Myers.
He never praised us, just as he never hugged us. Whenever my
grandmother urged him to tell us that we had done a good job, he
replied, “That’s their responsibility. Any job worth doing is
worth doing right.”158

This statement was on Justice Thomas’s mind, he tells us, as he
took his oath of office and became a Justice of the Supreme Court.
Struggling to control my surging emotions, I repeated the oath,
thinking as I did so how Daddy and Aunt Tina [Daddy’s wife]159
had raised me to fulfill it. Any job worth doing, they had told
me, is worth doing right. This, I knew, was a job worth doing.160

Justice Thomas clearly wants us to know that he aims to live by his
grandfather’s words but also that he will not forget who his
grandfather was and the milieu that his own determination helped
him escape. 161

CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR (2007).
Id. at 38.
159
Although Justice Thomas refers to Aunt Tina as his grandmother, she was not
a blood relation. Justice Thomas’s mother was Daddy’s daughter, born out of
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160
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161
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157
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Justice Thomas relates his experience upon reading Robert
Frost for the first time, and he excerpts for us a passage that he
read as if it told his own story: Two roads diverged in a wood, and
I -- / I took the one less traveled by, / And that has made all the
difference. 162 Justice Thomas tells us that reading the poem
“comforted me as I drifted farther from home,” reflecting his sense
of himself as “the odd man out.”163
Justice Thomas’s reading of the poem certainly resonates with
his reading of his life. He was a poor Black boy who aspired to be
a Catholic priest and then went on to serve on the U.S. Supreme
Court. He also joined that Court as its most conservative member,
hardly the road one would expect an African-American to take.
Unfortunately, his reading of the poem does not resonate at all with
the poem itself. That is, Justice Thomas’s interpretation is at odds
with clear markers of contrary meaning in the poem.164 Here it is
in full:
Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,
And sorry I could not travel both
And be one traveler, long I stood
And looked down one as far as I could
To where it bent in the undergrowth;
Then took the other, as just as fair,
And having perhaps the better claim,
Because it was grassy and wanted wear;
Though as for that the passing there
Had worn them really about the same,
And both that morning equally lay
In leaves no step had trodden black.
Oh, I kept the first for another day!
Yet knowing how way leads on to way,
I doubted if I should ever come back.

162
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I shall be telling this with a sigh
Somewhere ages and ages hence:
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.165

Thomas’s reading of the poem, evidenced by the way he has
excerpted it, is consistent with the most common interpretation of
the poem, an interpretation that is clearly at odds with the plain
meaning of the text. This reading ignores the poem’s two middle
stanzas and thus overlooks the profound irony of the final stanza.
The facts of the poem clearly contradict any claim that the
poem’s narrator took the road less traveled by or that such a choice
could have made any difference. The narrator expressly and
repeatedly tells us that the two roads were equally traveled by:
both are worn “about the same,” both “that morning equally lay in
leaves no step had trodden black.” The poem clearly announces
that nothing momentous turned on the traveler’s arbitrary choice.
Yes Justice Thomas follows the more-traveled-by reading of
Frost.166 Frost’s poem is often excerpted in precisely the way that
Justice Thomas has done. 167 People, seeking to reaffirm their
commitment to their self-conception as mavericks who follow their
self-appointed paths, place the last stanza of Frost’s poem (or parts
of it) on greeting cards or pin it to bulletin boards. But the fact that
that Justice Thomas’s interpretation of Frost is a common
misreading should give this originalist little solace. Excerpting the
poem as Justice Thomas has done violates contextual canons
enunciated by none other than Justice Scalia, 168 and there is no
reason to think the two men differ as to canons of construction.
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Texts should be construed as a whole,169 every word and provision
should be given effect, 170 and the words of a text should be
interpreted so as to make them compatible, not contradictory. 171
One might object that we are dealing here with a literary and not a
legal text, but it is hard to imagine why these particular interpretive
canons would not apply with the same force to a literary text.
The poem clearly mocks the narrator’s self-regard in the final
stanza and in fact, as the critic William Pritchard points out, the
complicated twists of the poem are what make it “un-boring.”172
The poem is not at all about what Justice Thomas takes it to be
about – choosing the unusual path for oneself. It is more about
what Justice Thomas, in writing his autobiography, is engaged in –
self-mythologizing 173 – but Justice Thomas lacks Frost’s ironic
frame of mind, at least in this context. And that makes all the
difference.
Questioning Justice Thomas’s skills as a literary critic may
seem uncharitable, but Justice Thomas’s approach to constitutional
interpretation places a premium on the judge’s ability to discern
the meaning of texts. His misreading of Frost illustrates the sorts
of hermeneutic slip-ups to which the judge as critic or as lawoffice historian will often be vulnerable. His misreading of Frost
suggests that Justice Thomas might be capable of misreading other
texts, including the text of his own life. To take just one example,
I want to look a bit more carefully at Justice Thomas’s relationship
to Yale Law School.
In his autobiography, Justice Thomas introduces the theme of
the contrast, learned from Daddy, between rattlesnakes and water
moccasins. Both are deadly, but rattlesnakes warn you with their
rattle, while water moccasins strike without warning. 174 This
distinction becomes Justice Thomas’s key metaphor for
169

See id., Canon 24 (whole text canon)
See id., Canon 26 (surplusage canon)
171
See id., Canon 27 (harmonious reading canon)
172
PRITCHARD, at 128.
173
See ORR, at 9 (summing up the scholarly consensus that poem is not “a salute
to can-do individualism” but “a commentary on the self-deception we practice
when constructing the story of our own lives”).
174
THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON, at 68.
170

38

understanding the different types of bigotry to which he is
subjected throughout his life. He could deal with the open bigotry
of the segregated South, but the deception of the liberal white
establishment posed the far greater danger.175 At the height of the
Anita Hill controversy, Justice Thomas reflects on lynch mobs
(rattlesnakes) and sanctimonious liberals (water moccasins):
As a child in the Deep South, I’d grown up fearing the lynch
mobs of the Ku Klux Klan; as an adult, I was starting to wonder
if I’d been afraid of the wrong white people all along. My worst
fears had come to pass not in Georgia but in Washington, D.C.,
where I was being pursued not by bigots in white robes but by
left-wing zealots draped in flowing sanctimony. For all the fear
I’d known as a boy in Savannah, this was the first time I’d found
myself at the mercy of people who would do whatever they
could to hurt me. . . .176

Yale Law School appears in Justice Thomas’s memoir as the
biggest water moccasin of them all.177
He provides no concrete examples of discriminatory conduct,
but he tells us that, right from the start, he felt out of place. 178
Although he recognized that he was out of place more because he
was disadvantaged than because he was Black, Justice Thomas
See id. at 109-10 (preferring white southerners’ “open bigotry” to that of the
“ostensibly unprejudiced whites who pretended to side with black people while
using them to further their own political and social ends”).
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believed that ultimately the stigma that attached to his admission to
law school based on affirmative action 179 could never be
eliminated regardless of his academic success.180 After graduating,
Justice Thomas boasts that he “peeled a fifteen-cent price sticker
off of a package of cigars and struck it to the frame of” his Yale
law degree to symbolize his “disillusionment” with the fact that
“Yale meant one thing for white graduates and another for
blacks.”181
Yet his memoir also provides ample evidence of the benefits he
derived not from his Yale Law School education but from having
gone to Yale. He landed his first summer job during law school –
the only one he applied for and the only one he wanted 182 –
because his Yale classmate, Lani Guinier, helped him “obtain a
$60-a-week Law Students Civil Rights Research Council grant
from the Legal Defense Fund” so that he might do so.183 During
his third year in law school, Justice Thomas applied to work for
Missouri’s Attorney General John Danforth because he had heard
that Danforth was “looking for other Yalies to work for him.”184
John Danforth also found a place for Thomas to live rent-free
while he was studying for the bar185 and secured a loan for him
when he defaulted on his student loans.186
Through John Danforth’s contacts, and now on the strength of
his fine performance in the Missouri Attorney General’s office,
Justice Thomas was able to move into a far better-paying job with
the Monsanto Corporation.187 That job proved short-lived. Justice
Thomas expresses some concern about the harms corporations like
179
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Monsanto caused to ordinary working people, but it seems he was
simply not interested in the work at Monsanto – and there wasn’t
enough for him to do there to keep him occupied.188 In any case,
John Danforth, now a Senator, once again rescued Justice Thomas
by inviting him to join the Senator’s staff in Washington, D.C.189
A few years after moving to the capital, Justice Thomas
determined that he could no longer remain in his marriage. With
great reluctance and tormented by guilty feelings, he left his wife
and child. He moved in with a friend from Yale Law School.190 As
Scott Gerber put it, “Thomas’s association with Danforth would
later prove to be the most important in his professional career.”191
Without Yale, Justice Thomas’s career would have looked very
different.
All of this evidence is presented in Justice Thomas’s
autobiography, and it suggests that Justice Thomas grossly
misreads the importance of Yale Law School to his career. He
does so in a manner consistent with his misreading of Frost. That
is, the autobiography insists on Justice Thomas’s outlier status as a
self-made man and resists any suggestion that institutions such as
Yale, affirmative action, and the federal government itself might
have played important roles. Nor does he acknowledge that he was
the beneficiary of the support of political allies eager to push
forward the career of a young Black conservative.
The
autobiography suggests that, while Justice Thomas took a lesstraveled by road, that road would look very different to an outside
observer than it does to Justice Thomas.
Aside from the obligatory acknowledgement of youthful
indiscretions, Justice Thomas’s autobiography does not evidence
188
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extensive self-critical reflection.
Not coincidentally, the selfcritical moment is precisely what is missing in today’s originalism.
The result can be a form of robust judicial activism that differs
from older forms of judicial activism in its justification but not in
its results: the reversal of legislative enactments by five men (the
women dissent) in robes. As Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson noted in
his critique of Heller,192 conservatives may win certain battles in
overturning legislation that they find objectionable, but in doing
so, they undermine the very conservative principles that gave rise
to the ideology of originalism in constitutional interpretation –
separation of powers, judicial restraint, textualism and
federalism.193 Now only originalism remains.194

V.

Conclusion: The Future of an Illusion

In Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents, he summarizes his
earlier work, The Future of an Illusion, which is on the subject of
religious belief.195 Freud calls religious belief “patently infantile”
and “foreign to reality,” but he also concedes that “the great
majority of mortals will never be able to rise above this view of
life.” 196 So the non-originalist might conclude with respect to
originalism. Even as originalism in its scholarly form grows more
sophisticated and multi-valent, popular originalism thrives as a
blunt instrument used to constrain activist (read “liberal”)
judges. 197 As Thomas Colby points out, “Originalism somehow
continues to thrive as both a political movement and as a scholarly
theory, even though the features that make it attractive as a
political movement render it impotent as a scholarly theory and
192
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vice versa.”198
My conclusion is somewhat different.
The future of
originalism as a popular movement that exerts a normative pull on
judges to adhere to the written text of the Constitution is bright but
illusory. Politicians and judges can easily adjust their rhetoric to
nourish that populist notion of what constitutional adjudication
ought to be. However regardless of their rhetoric, judges will
continue to be constrained, not by the written text of the
Constitution, but by the main sources of human malaise that Freud
identified in Civilization and Its Discontents: the outside world,
their own bodily infirmities (here of the cognitive variety), and
other people.199
The world will continue to confront judges with novel
situations and textual meaning will continue to run out, leaving the
judges to their own devices for constitutional adjudication. Judges
of good will and intention will continue to render decisions in the
name of originalism that will be subject to lively criticisms. Some
of those criticisms will focus on the faulty methodology,
subjectivism, tendentious interpretation, and incomplete historical
evidence and thus point out the judge’s intellectual limitations.
Other criticisms will evidence the continuing debate between
origianlism and non-originalism. People on both sides of the
divide have entrenched positions, and neither side is going away.
Originalism’s rhetorical advantages suggest that its adherents will
become increasingly confident of the judiciary’s ability to do the
job right. Increasily, its chief practitioners have lost sight of Justice
Scalia’s fundamental insight that originalism is something that
federal judges can only do badly.
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